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this article. A careful scholar might qualify this axiom on transport costs in the pre-railway
era by noting the importance of canals in many countries as the necessary precursors to
railroads; but in so doing one should emphasize the obvious point that canals obviously
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The Low Countries’ Export Trade in
Textiles with the Mediterranean Basin, 1200-1600:
A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Comparative
Advantages in Overland and Maritime Trade Routes
John H. Munro
The question that is implicit in the title of this article might warrant the
briefest of answers. For is it not self evident that seaborne trade was always
much cheaper to conduct than overland continental trade? Is it not a fact
that in pre-modern economies overland transport costs could effectively
double the commodity price of grains, lumber, metallic ores and other bulk
goods within fifty to seventy km., while sea transport could deliver such
cargoes much more cheaply over longer distances? From such cost
comparisons has arisen one of the basic axioms in economic history: that,
before the nineteenth-century transport revolution in steam-powered
railways, economic development fundamentally depended upon maritime
transport and the exercise of seapower.1
Much evidence for this thesis should be found in the late medieval
and early modern Low Countries, where economic growth, fueled
principally by international trade, outpaced that of all other regions in
northern Europe. Yet this is not altogether the case. As this article
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2  See, for example, Jan De Vries and Ad Van der Woude, Nederland 1500-1815:
De eerste ronde van moderne economische groei (Amsterdam, 1995; republished in English
as The First Modern Economy: Growth, Decline, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy,
1500-1815 [Cambridge, 1996]); Jonathan I. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-
1740 (Oxford, 1989); Violet Barbour, “Dutch and English Merchant Shipping in the
Seventeenth Century,” Economic History Review, First Series, II (1930) (reprinted in E.M.
Carus-Wilson [ed.], Essays in Economic History, I [London, 1954], 227-253); Richard W.
Unger, Ships and Shipping in the North Sea and Atlantic, 1400-1800 (Aldershot, 1997);
Unger, Dutch Shipbuilding Before 1800: Ships and Guilds (Assen, 1978); Unger, The Ship
in the Medieval Economy, 600-1600 (London, 1980); F. Ketner, Handel en scheepvaart van
Amsterdam in de vijftiende eeuw (Leiden, 1946); Dick E.H. De Boer, Graaf en Grafiek:
sociale en economische ontwikkelingen in het middeleeuwse, Noordholland, tussen 1345 en
1415 (Leiden, 1978); Herman Van der Wee, The Low Countries in the Early Modern World
demonstrates, the means by which the key manufactured products of
northwest Europe, textiles, were transported to their most important
markets, those in the Mediterranean basin, varied over time according to a
range of factors, the most important of which was warfare. For much of the
medieval and early-modern eras, overland transport played a vital role in
the distribution of goods across Europe and served to stimulate market
expansion and economic growth. This contention lends broad support to
Herman Van der Wee’s thesis that such land-based continental trade was a
prime influence in the economic development of medieval and early-
modern Europe. Although Van der Wee first advanced such views as long
ago as 1963 (see note 6 below), this interpretation of the pattern and
significance of comparative transport costs has since been subject to the
malign neglect of most economic historians. The message in this article is
that they should reflect more carefully about these issues.
I
In analysing the history of the Low Countries, which collectively played
such a dominant role in European economic development over an eight-
hundred year span, no historian would dare, of course, to neglect the
importance of maritime factors; and virtually all would agree, for example,
that the Dutch hegemony in the seventeenth-century economy was
fundamentally based upon the seapower that the northern Low Countries so
skilfully exercised in their maritime commerce with the Baltic and the East
Indies. In the southern Low Countries, maritime commerce with England,
the North Sea littoral, and the Baltic had certainly played a vital role in their
precocious economic growth from at least the late eleventh or early twelfth
century.2 Yet an even more powerful element in their subsequent develop-
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(London, 1993); and J.A. van Houtte, An Economic History of the Low Countries, 800-1800
(London, 1977).
3  See Renée  Doehaerd (ed.), Les relations commerciales entre Gênes, la
Belgique, et l’Outremont, d’après les archives notariales génoises aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles
(3 vols., Brussels, 1941); R.L. Reynolds, “The Market for Northern Textiles in Genoa, 1179-
1200,” Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire, VIII (1929), 831-850; Hilmar Krueger, “The
Genoese Exportation of Northern Cloths to Mediterranean Ports, Twelfth Century,” Revue
belge de philologie et d’histoire, LXV (1987), 722-750; Robert-Henri Bautier, “Recherches
sur les routes de l’Europe médiévale, I: De Paris et des Foires de Champagne à la
Méditerranée par le Massif Central,” Bulletin philologique et historique (jusqu’à 1610),
année 1960 (Paris, 1961), 99-143; Bautier, “Recherches sur les routes de l’Europe
médiévale, II: Le grand axe routier Est-Ouest du Midi de la France: d’Avignon à Toulouse,”
Bulletin philologique et historique (jusqu’à 1610), année 1961 (Paris, 1963), 277-308;
Bautier, “Les foires de Champagne: recherches sur une évolution historique,” Recueils de
la Société Jean Bodin, V: La Foire (Brussels, 1953), 97-147; Patrick Chorley, “The Cloth
Exports of Flanders and Northern France During the Thirteenth Century: A Luxury Trade?”
Economic History Review, Second Series, XL, No. 3 (August 1987), 349-379; Chorley,
“English Cloth Exports During the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries: The
Continental Evidence,” Historical Research, LXI (February 1988), 1-10; Wendy Childs,
“The English Export Trade in Cloth in the Fourteenth Century,” in Richard Britnell and John
Hatcher (eds.), Progress and Problems in Medieval England (Cambridge, 1996), 121-147;
John Munro, “Industrial Transformations in the North-West European Textile Trades, c.
1290-c. 1340: Economic Progress or Economic Crisis?” in Bruce M.S. Campbell (ed.),
Before the Black Death: Studies in the “Crisis” of the Early Fourteenth Century
(Manchester, 1991), 110-148 (reprinted in Munro, Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Essays in the
Economic History of Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries [London, 1994];
Munro, “The Origins of the English ‘New Draperies’: The Resurrection of an Old Flemish
Industry 1270-1570,” in Negley B. Harte (ed.), The New Draperies in the Low Countries and
England, 1300-1800 (Oxford, 1997), 35-127; Munro, “The Symbiosis of Towns and
Textiles: Urban Institutions and the Changing Fortunes of Cloth Manufacturing in the Low
Countries and England, 1270-1570,” Journal of Early Modern History, III, No. 1 (February:
1999), 1-74; Munro, “The ‘Industrial Crisis’ of the English Textile Towns, 1290-1330,” in
ment, notably in the expansion of the Flemish and Artesian textile industries
during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, was the overland trade with the
Champagne Fairs of northeastern France. This provided a significant
conduit for a rising tide of Flemish, Artesian, and other northern textiles
sent to Italy and the Mediterranean basin, which was not yet linked to
northwest Europe by sea transport. A densely populated, extensively
urbanized region, this was still by far the most advanced zone in the
European economy. Accordingly, it provided the largest export market for
northern textiles, particularly for the lighter, coarser and cheaper textiles,
which evidently then constituted the bulk of northern textile exports –
Flemish, French, English, and German – both by volume and value.3
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Michael Prestwich, Richard Britnell, and Robin Frame (eds.), Thirteenth-Century England,
VII (Woodbridge, UK, 1999), 103-141.
4  Renée Doehaerd, “Les galères génoises dans la Manche et la Mer du Nord  à la
fin du XIIIe siècle et au début du XIVe siècle,” Bulletin de l’Institut historique belge de
Rome, XIX (1938), 5-76; Georges Yver, Le commerce et les marchands dans l’Italie
mériodoniale au XIIIe et au XIVe siècle (Paris, 1903); Alfons Schaube, “Die Anfänge der
venezianischen Galeerenfahrten nach der Nordsee,” Historische Zeitschrift, 3rd series, CI
(1908), 28-89; R. Cessi, “Le relazioni commerciali tra Venezia e le Fiandre nel secolo XIV,”
Nuovo Archivio Veneto, new series, XXVII (1914); E.H. Byrne, Genoese Shipping in the
Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries (Cambridge, MA, 1930); and Federigo Melis, “La
formazione dei costi nell’industria laniera alla fine del Trecento,” Economia e storia: Rivista
italiana di storia economica e sociale, I (June-September 1954), 31-53. On the costs of the
sea transport of textiles, see Armando Sapori, Le marchand italien au moyen âge, École
Pratique des Hautes Études, VIe section: Affaires et gens d’affaires (Paris, 1952), part IV:
“Routes et transports,” 64-74; Robert Lopez, Studi sull’economia genovese nel medio evo
(Turin, 1936); and Lopez, “The Trade of Medieval Europe: The South,” in M.M. Postan and
E.E. Rich (eds.), Cambridge Economic History of Europe, II: Trade and Industry in the
Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1952), 257-354.
5  Raymond De Roover, “The Commercial Revolution of the Thirteenth Century,”
Bulletin of the Business Historical Society, XVI (1942), 34-39 (reprinted in F.C. Lane and
Jelle Riemersma [eds.], Enterprise and Secular Change [New York, 1953], 80-85); De
As the textbooks tell us, however, the Champagne Fairs, enjoying
only an ephemeral glory, did not survive beyond the early fourteenth
century, because supposedly radical advances in maritime transport during
this era had made their continental-oriented commerce quite redundant.  As
early as c.1274, the Genoese had made the first direct maritime contact with
Flanders; and by 1317 the Italians had instituted a fairly regular annual
galley service to Bruges. The Venetians, after founding their Bruges
consulate in 1322 and establishing a maritime link with Southampton, came
to dominate that northern galley trade.4 According to Raymond De Roover,
ancillary commercial developments also help to explain the post-1320
redundancy of the Champagne Fairs and the itinerant trade of its visiting
merchants. From this decade, the great Italian merchant-banking houses
began establishing branch offices in Bruges, Paris, London and other
northern towns, with permanently stationed factors, who transacted their
long-distance commerce by a sedentary principal-agent system involving
the newly devised bills of exchange.  These simple, informal four-party
holograph documents quickly displaced the more costly and cumbersome
notarized instrumenta ex causa cambii (“lettres de foire”), which merchants
had long been required to use in person, in conducting trade at these Fairs.5
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Roover, “Money, Banking, and Credit in Medieval Bruges,” Journal of Economic History,
II (1942), Supplement, 52-65; De Roover, “Le contrat de change depuis la fin du treizième
siècle jusqu’au début du dix-septième,” Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire, XXV (1946-
1947), 111-128; De Roover, Money, Banking and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges: Italian
Merchant-Bankers, Lombards, and Money Changers: A Study in the Origins of Banking
(Cambridge, MA, 1948); De Roover, L’evolution de la lettre de change, XIVe-XVIIIe siècles
(Paris, 1953); De Roover, “New Interpretations of the History of Banking,” Journal of
World History, II (1954), 38-76 (reprinted in Julius Kirshner [ed.], Business, Banking, and
Economic Thought in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Selected Studies of
Raymond de Roover [Chicago, 1974], 200-238); and De Roover, “The Organization of
Trade,” in M.M. Postan and E.E. Rich (eds.), Cambridge Economic History of Europe. III:
Economic Organization and Policies in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1963), 42-118.
For those who entertain concepts of linear progress, however, the
trade-based theses of Herman Van der Wee subsequently provided an
unpleasant surprise. In his 1963 monograph, and then more generally in an
article of 1970, Van der Wee contended that the relative balance between
maritime and continental trade, and the relative prosperity of the latter, had
played the fundamental role in determining long waves, or cycles of
expansion and decline, in the European economy up to the eighteenth
century. Thus, the revival, spread, and intensification of overland trade
between northwest Europe and the Mediterranean from the eleventh century
promoted a general European economic prosperity that lasted until the early
fourteenth century. Moreover, the vitality of overland commerce, both
north-south and then east-west, contributed to general economic growth via
backward and forward linkages throughout a vast continental hinterland. In
particular, under-utilized resources were diverted from the large, generally
backward agrarian sector into the more productive industrial, commercial,
and financial sectors. Conversely, he argued, the relative shift of interna-
tional trade from transcontinental to the new maritime routes in the early
fourteenth century ultimately had a negative, depressing impact on the
aggregate economy of late medieval Europe.
The consequent contraction in overland, continental trade,
beginning with the Champagne Fairs and its arterial routes, soon spread via
many more tributary routes into the regional and local trade networks that
serviced thousands of towns and villages throughout the vast continental
hinterland. The demand for transport and commercial services, labour,
manufactures, foodstuffs and other goods diminished as a result. Declining
consumption, in turn, reduced investment and aggregate incomes by a
reverse multiplier-accelerator effect. While the diversion of international
trade flows into new shipping lanes certainly benefited the major partici-
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6  Herman Van der Wee, The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European
Economy, 14th to 16th Centuries (3 vols., The Hague, 1963), II, 34-120; Van der Wee and
Theo Peeters, “Un modèle dynamique de croissance interseculaire du commerce mondiale,
XIIe-XVIIIe siècles,” Annales: E.S.C., XV (1970), 100-126; and partly reiterated in Van der
Wee, “Structural Changes in European Long-Distance Trade, and Particularly in the Re-
export Trade from South to North, 1350-1750,” in James D. Tracy (ed.), The Rise of
Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750
(Cambridge, 1990), 14-33.
7 In essence, Pirenne  posited  an economic  retrogression in early medieval
Europe, with a rapid decline in seaborne international trade, as a consequence of Muslim
conquests of Mediterranean sea-lanes; subsequently, there was an Italian counter-attack –
the revival of both Mediterranean seaborne and overland long-distance trade – which
fostered economic revival, urban growth, and general economic development from the early
eleventh century. See Henri Pirenne, Mahomet et Charlemagne (Paris, 1937; in English
translation, Mohammad and Charlemagne [London, 1939]); Pirenne, Histoire économique
de l’occident médiéval (Bruges, 1951); A.F. Havighurst (ed.), The Pirenne Thesis: Analysis,
Criticism, and Revision (New York, 1958); William Carroll Bark, Origins of the Medieval
World (London, 1957); Robert LaTouche, The Birth of the Western Economy: Economic
Aspects of the Dark Ages (London, 1956); Robert S. Lopez, “Mohammad and Charlemagne:
A Revision,” Speculum, XXVIII (1943); Eliyahu Ashtor, “Quelques observations d’un
orientaliste sur la thèse de Pirenne,” Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient,
XIII (1970), 166-194; and Eliyahu Ashtor, “Nouvelles réflexions sur la thèse de Pirenne,”
Revue Suisse d’histoire, XX (1970), 601-607 (reprinted in Ashtor, Studies on Levantine
Trade in the Middle Ages [London, 1978]).
8  In essence, the Miskimin thesis contends that a post-Plague hedonistic spending
spree of inherited cash balances on costly luxury goods, combined with Papal taxation and
warfare, drained bullion from northern to southern Europe. As Europe collectively increased
pants – the seaports of Italy, Catalonia, the Netherlands, the Baltic, and
even England – their impressive gains could not offset the much greater
aggregate economic decline in the continental hinterlands of late medieval
Europe. Furthermore, this diversion of international trade tended to
concentrate wealth and income flows into fewer hands, especially in the
maritime states. This in turn had such negative economic consequences as
increased hoarding, non-productive expenditures on ostentatious display,
and excessive imports of eastern luxury goods, whose consumption required
a growing and deflationary drain of precious metals from western Europe
to the Baltic and especially the Levant.6
Some may find Van der Wee’s international trade model redolent
of the old Pirenne thesis on Mediterranean trade in the early medieval
economy,7 and the more recent Miskimin thesis, on late medieval interna-
tional trade deficits with, and consequent bullion outflows to, the East.8 Van
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its imports of eastern luxury goods (from both the Baltic and eastern Mediterranean), thereby
worsening its balance of payments deficit with the East, such trade led to an increased
bullion outflow. The consequent monetary contraction exacerbated Europe’s late medieval
economic contraction, or “great depression.” See Harry Miskimin, “Monetary Movements
and Market Structures: Forces for Contraction in 14th and 15th Century England,” Journal
of Economic History, XXIV (1964), 470-490 (reprinted in Harry A. Miskimin, Cash, Credit,
and Crisis in Europe, 1300-1600 [London, 1989]); Miskimin, The Economy of Early
Renaissance Europe, 1300-1460 (1969; reprint, Cambridge, 1975); Robert Lopez and
Miskimin, “The Economic Depression of the Renaissance,” Economic History Review,
Second Series, XIV (1962), 408-426; Lopez, Miskimin, and A.L. Udovitch, “England to
Egypt, 1350-1500: Long-Term Trends and Long-Distance Trade,” in M.A. Cook (ed.),
Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East (London, 1970), 93-128. For related, if
variant, views, see John Day, “The Great Bullion Famine of the Fifteenth Century,” Past
and Present, No. 79 (May 1978), 1-54 (reprinted in Day, The Medieval Market Economy
[Oxford, 1987], 1-54); and Peter Spufford, Money and Its Use in Medieval Europe
(Cambridge, 1988), 339-395. For a critique of this model, see Clyde Reed, “Price
Movements, Balance of Payments, Bullion Flows, and Unemployment in the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Centuries,” Journal of European Economic History, VIII (1979), 479-487.  For a
more general overview, see John Munro, “Patterns of Trade, Money, and Credit,” in James
Tracy, Thomas Brady, Jr., and Heiko Oberman (eds.), Handbook of European History in the
Later Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation, 1400-1600, Vol. I: Structures and
Assertions (Leiden, 1994), 147-195. See note 28 below for the relevance of this debate for
the topic of this article.
9  Raymond Van Uytven, “The Economics of Land Transport in the Late-Medieval
and Early-Modern Low Countries: The Case of the Duchy of Brabant in the 15th and 16th
Centuries” (Paper Presented to the Economic History Workshop, University of Toronto, 1
February 1993). This was subsequently published in revised form as “Landtransport durch
Brabant im Mittelalter und im 16. Jahrhundert,” in F. Burgard and A. Haverkamp (eds.), Auf
den Römerstrassen im Mittelalter: Beiträge zur Vehrkersgeschichte zwischen Maas und
Rhein von der Spätantike bis ins 19. Jahrhundert (Mainz, 1998), 471-499.
der Wee’s seemingly similar model has thus enjoyed no more support from
current economic historians than have these two earlier theses. For instance,
Raymond Van Uytven has contended that the Brabant land toll registers
contradict the view that “a shift from continental trade to maritime shipping
[was] a cause of the economic decline of the later Middle Ages.”9 However,
this attack on the Van der Wee thesis may be rebutted on three counts. First
and foremost, an international trade model concerning overland commercial
flows between northwest Europe and Italy can hardly be tested by one
isolated, local set of land tolls, especially when the bases of its numeric data
are not fully clear. Second, the Brabant land toll registers commence far too
late, in 1406, to provide such a test, especially since they become continu-
ous only from 1433, almost a century after the beginning of the shift in
maritime trade that the Van der Wee model has posited. Third, these land
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10  See note 11.
11  Van der Wee, Antwerp Market. This monograph was built on the scholarship
of J.A. Goris, Étude sur les colonies marchandes mériodionales à Anvers de 1488 à 1567
(Leuven, 1925);  Emile Coornaert, Les français et le commerce international à Anvers, fin
du XVe-XVIe siècle (2 vols., Paris, 1961); Jan A. Van Houtte, “La genèse du grande marché
international d’Anvers à la fin du moyen âge,” Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire, XIX
(1940), 87-126; Van Houtte, “Bruges et Anvers: marchés ‘nationaux’ ou ‘internationaux’
du XIVe au XVIe siècle?” Revue du Nord, XXIV (1952), 89-108; Van Houtte, “Anvers aux
XVe et XVIe siècle,” Annales: E.S.C., XVI (1961), 248-278; Van Houtte, “The Rise and
Decline of the Market of Bruges,” Economic History Review, Second Series, XIX (1966),
29-47; Oskar De Smedt, De engelse natie te Antwerpen in de 16e eeuw (2 vols., Antwerp,
1950); Wilfrid Brulez, “L’exportation des Pays-Bas vers l’Italie par voie de terre au milieu
de XVIe siècle,” Annales: Économies, sociétés, civilisations, XIV (1959), 461-491. See also
Brulez, “Le commerce international des Pays-Bas au XVIe siècle: essai d’appreciation
quantitative,” Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire, XLVI (1968), 1205-1221 (republished
as “The International Trade of the Low Countries in the Sixteenth Century,” in Acta
Historiae Neerlandicae, IV [1970]); and Brulez, “Bruges and Antwerp in the 15th and 16th
Centuries: An Antithesis?” Acta Historiae Neerlandicae, VI (1973), 1-26.
12  Moreover, if the supposedly superior bill of exchange, as a feature of sedentary
branch-firm commerce, had fully superseded the earlier fair-letters (instrumenta ex causa
cambii), then how do we explain the phenomenon of the bill or letter obligatory? The direct
toll registers indicate a rise in overland commercial traffic that virtually
accords with an important aspect of Van der Wee’s model.  For he contends
that a fifteenth-century revival of transcontinental trade flows stimulated
both a renewed expansion of the European continental economy and the
transformation of Antwerp from a merely regional foodstuffs fair (the
Brabant Fairs) to become Europe’s leading commercial and financial
entrepôt, a role that it enjoyed for well more than a century.10
Indeed, the chief strength of the Van der Wee thesis lies in the
detailed evidence that it offers on this latter phenomenon.11 Furthermore, if
that previous, fourteenth-century shift from transcontinental to maritime
routes, along with the move from itinerant fair-commerce to “sedentary”
branch-firm commerce, had been the manifestation of economic progress,
as most earlier historians argued, how do we explain the indisputable
revival and expansion of transcontinental trade from the mid-fifteenth to
early seventeenth centuries? And, more strikingly, how do we account for
the revival of periodic international fairs, and seasonal cycles of adjacent
fairs, along the overland routes, not only in Brabant itself - the four fairs of
Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom – but also in Frankfurt, Besançon, Lyons,
Geneva, and Cremona?12
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ancestor of the modern promissory note, it had become a fully negotiable bearer bill, much
more so than the Italian bill of exchange, by the later fifteenth century, and was far more
prominent than bills of exchange in transacting commerce and finance – including short-
term public lending – both in London and in Antwerp during the later fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. See Michael Postan, “Credit in Medieval Trade,” Economic History Review, First
Series, I (1928), 234-261 (reprinted in Michael Postan, Medieval Trade and Finance
[Cambridge, 1983], 1-27); Postan, “Private Financial Instruments in Medieval England,”
Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, XXIII (1930; reprinted in his
Medieval Trade and Finance, 28-64); Herman Van der Wee, “Anvers et les innovations de
la technique financière aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles,” Annales: E.S.C., XXII (1967), 1067-
1089 (republished as “Antwerp and the New Financial Methods of the 16th and 17th
Centuries,” in Van der Wee, Low Countries, 145-166; Van der Wee, Growth of the Antwerp
Market, II, 333-368; Van der Wee, “Monetary, Credit, and Banking Systems,” in E.E. Rich
and Charles Wilson (eds.), Cambridge Economic History of Europe. V: The Economic
Organization of Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1977), 310-335; Van der Wee, “The
Medieval and Early-Modern Origins of European Banking,” in Dino Puncuh and Giuseppe
Felloni (eds.), Banchi pubblici, banchi privati e monti di pietà nell’Europa preindustriale:
Amministrazione, tecniche operative e ruoli economici (2 vols., Genoa, 1991), II, 1157-
1173; and John Munro, “The International Law Merchant and the Evolution of Negotiable
Credit in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries,” in ibid., I, 49-80 (reprinted in
Munro, Textiles, Towns, and Trade).
13 Furthermore, the data-free econometric model (Peeters, “Un modèle
dynamique”) that constitutes the remaining nine pages of the article serves only to obfuscate
the model and, I fear, to dissuade many historians from taking it as seriously as this seminal
article should be.
14 See in particular Richard Unger, “Dutch Ship Design in the Fifteenth and
Sixteenth Centuries,” Viator, IV (1973), 387-412; Unger, Dutch Shipbuilding before 1800;
Unger, The Ship in the Medieval Economy; Unger, “Warships and Cargo Ships in Medieval
The fundamental weaknesses of the Van der Wee thesis stem from
his attempt to construct an international trade model spanning six centuries
in just sixteen pages.13 In particular, the explanation of the earlier,
fourteenth-century shift from transcontinental to maritime trade is
inadequate, largely because the chronology of this transition is left vague,
though presumably it was underway by the 1320s. He seems to suggest,
more in line with traditional views than with the logic of his own model,
that it took place because the Italians had found the direct sea route to
Flanders more cost effective and advantageous, chiefly because of technical
advances in ship design and navigation. But most of these improvements,
especially the emergence of the caravel design, the full-rigged carrack, the
quadrant and astrolabe, etc., came a full century after this maritime trade
had assumed its ascendancy.14 Moreover, Russell Menard has recently
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Europe,” Technology and Culture, XXII (April 1981), 233-252; Unger, “Portuguese
Shipbuilding and the Early Voyages to the Guinea Coast,” in Vice-Almirante A. Teixeira Da
Mota, In Memoriam, I (Lisbon, 1987), 229-249; Carlo Cipolla, Guns, Sails, and Empires:
Technological Innovation and the Early Phases of European Expansion 1400-1700 (New
York, 1965); Charles R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825 (London,
1969); Martin Elbl, “The Portuguese Caravel and European Shipbuilding: Phases of
Development and Diversity,” Revista da Universidade de Coimbra, XXXIII (1985), 543-
572; Elbl, “The Caravel and the Galleon,” in Robert Gardiner (ed.), Conway’s History of the
Ship. III: Cogs, Caravels and Galleons (London, 1994), 91-98; and Archibald Lewis and
Timothy Runyan, European Naval and Maritime History, 300-1500 (Bloomington, 1985).
15  Russell Menard, “Transport Costs and Long-Range Trade, 1300-1800: Was
There a European ‘Transport Revolution’ in the Early Modern Era?” in James Tracy (ed.),
The Political Economy of Merchant Empires: State Power and World Trade, 1350-1750
(Cambridge, 1991), 228-275. For similar views, see Munro, “Industrial Transformations,”
110-148, and the sources in note 3.
16  Michael Postan, “The Trade of Medieval Europe: The North,” in Postan and
Rich (eds.), Cambridge Economic History of Europe, II, 203-204, continues: “Inefficient the
service certainly was, wasteful of manpower and other resources; but so was medieval
industry and agriculture...To put it more abstractly, the proportion of trading costs to total
costs was probably less in the Middle Ages than now, which is merely another way of saying
that far greater economies have resulted from industrial revolutions of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries than from corresponding improvements in transport and distribution.”
argued that such changes in naval technology had little impact on direct
shipping costs, from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries, whose
decline he attributes instead to those political and commercial developments
that provided greater maritime security.15 On this point, Menard quotes
Michael Postan to the effect that “medieval communications, like other
trading activities, suffered much more from instability and uncertainty,
political in origin, than from high costs of an inefficient transport service.”16
These issues do play a role in Van der Wee’s trade model, in the
form of the Hundred Years War (1336-1453). In his view, even if that
conflict had begun much too late to explain the initial shift to maritime
trade, it reinforced and prolonged that development by so frequently
disrupting the major overland trade routes. Van der Wee, however,
overlooked an earlier series of wars, more debilitating than any since the
Carolingian era, which even more directly disrupted these overland routes,
forcing the Italians to turn to a safer sea route to northwest Europe. In
northwest Europe, this new era of widespread warfare had commenced
during the 1290s, with the Anglo-French and Franco-Flemish conflicts,
followed by the Flemish civil wars (to 1328). In the south, the Angevin-
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17  For the evidence on the economic consequences of such warfare, particularly
in rising transport and transaction costs, see Munro, “Industrial Transformations,” 110-148;
Munro, “Resurrection of an Old Flemish Industry,” 35-127; Munro, “Industrial Crisis of the
English Textile Towns,” 104-142; and the sources in notes 3 and 26.
18 Doehaerd, Relations commerciales, III, 1156: “Nec per terra ire potuit
communiter propter guerras que presentaliter occurentes inter Januinos guelfos et
guibelines.” Subsequently (1343), Marseilles conducted a civic inquest that also blamed
those wars for the drastic decline in its trade. The text in Georges Lesage, Marseille
angevine: recherches sur son evolution administrative économique et urbaine de la victoire
de Charles d’Anjou à l’arrivée de Jeanne Ire (1264-1348) (Paris, 1950), 184-186, goes on:
“quod deterioratio et diminutio dictorum reddituum provenit propter diminucionem boni
status civitatis Massilie, nam sicut civitas in personis et divitiis a tempore quo perdita fuit
Acon et propter perdicionem ipsius et propter guerras quas habuerent ipsi Massilienses et
sicut omnes redditus quos civitas ipsa habeat in communi et successive habuit domnus noster
Rex et precessores sui diminuti sunt et reducti ad minorem quantitatem.” See also Edouard
Baratier and Félix Reynaud, Histoire du commerce de Marseille. II: De 1291 à 1480 (Paris,
1951), 38-40, 207-228 and 304-313.
19 Federigo Melis, “La diffusione nel Mediterranea occidentale dei panni di
Wervicq e delle altre citta della Lys attorna al 1400,” in Studi in onore di Amintore Fanfani
III: Medioevo (Milan, 1962), 233-234, n. 30, letter of Gulgielmo Barberi to Datini Co.,
Barcelona, 10 May 1398: for transporting a Wervik woollen cloth, worth twenty-three gold
francs (or about twenty-two gold florins): by land, five francs; by sea, 3.5 francs. Just one
Aragonese wars, embroiling Aragon-Catalonia, southern France, Sicily,
Naples, and the Papacy, had begun even earlier but reached their peak just
before the truce of 1302. Shortly after, in 1310, Imperial German armies
invaded Italy and thereby turned festering Angevin-Aragonese strife into
the far more ferocious and destructive Guelf-Ghibelline wars (1313-1343).
For the next four decades, Italy was devastated by the repeated incursions
of Catalan, French, German, and Hungarian forces, and the constant
depredations of mercenary Free Companies of disbanded soldiers.17 In
1327, an Italian merchant cited these Guelf-Ghibelline wars as the reason
why he was no longer able to transport his cloths from the now dying
Champagne Fairs to Genoa.18
Certainly, during the fourteenth century, the maritime routes
between Italy and Flanders provided cheaper transport than the overland
routes that continued to function. In the 1390s, an Italian merchant firm
reported that the cost of sending luxury Wervik woollens from Bruges to
Barcelona was fifteen percent of the price (twenty-two gold florins) by sea
and twenty-two percent of the price by land. The report also noted that other
merchants had “lost all their profit” by sending their woollens overland.19
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of these woollens, then worth twenty-two gold florins or £3 0s 6d groot Flemish, would have
cost a Bruges master-mason, then the highest paid in northern Europe, his full wages for
seventy-three days (at ten pence per day). On 28 May 1397, the Alberti firm in Bruges
informed Datini that only high-priced cloths could be shipped overland: “perch e’ panni di
grande pregio possono meglio che que’ di piccoli pregi [sopportare il viaggio terrestre];
anzi, lo possono e gli altri non.” Ibid. See also E.B. Fryde, “Italian Maritime Trade with
Medieval England (ca. 1270-c. 1530),” Recueils de la société Jean Bodin, XXXII (1974),
310; Fryde, “The English Cloth Industry and the Trade with the Mediterranean, c. 1370-c.
1530,” in Marco Spallanzani (ed.), Produzione, commercio e consumo de panni di lana nei
secoli XII - XVII (Florence, 1976), 343-367; Fryde, “Anglo-Italian Commerce in the
Fifteenth Century: Some Evidence about Profits and the Balance of Trade,” Revue belge de
philologie et d’histoire, L (1972), 345-355; all three are reprinted in Fryde, Studies in
Medieval Trade and Finance (London, 1983). For the relative coinage values, see Peter
Spufford, Handbook of Medieval Exchange (London, 1986), 179 and 191. For wages, see
John Munro, “Urban Wage Structures in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries:
Work-Time and Seasonal Wages,” in Ian Blanchard (ed.),  Labour and Leisure in Historical
Perspective, Thirteenth to Twentieth Centuries, Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und
Wirtschaftsgeschichte Beiheft series no. 116  (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994), 67,
Table 4-1.
20 Armando Sapori, Una compagnia di calimala ai primi del trecento (Florence,
1932), 97-99. The Caen says were then priced at 11.5 florins; and the cost of transporting
133 says was 1.01 florin per say (total marketing costs amounted to 2.20 florins per say, or
19.2%). In another account, total marketing costs for sixty-four Caen says were 2.41 fl. per
say, or 9.5% more per say in the smaller shipment. Caen says were then the most expensive.
See also Chorley, “Cloth Exports of Flanders,” 369. Comparing relative gold values is
difficult, except to note that the early fourteenth century was a period of inflation; the late
fourteenth century, one of deflation. For other evidence on the relatively low costs of
overland transport in thirteenth-century Europe, see Bautier, “Recherches sur les routes,”
especially 99-143; and James Masschaele, “Transport Costs in Medieval England,”
Economic History Review, Second Series, XLVI, No. 2 (May 1993), 266-279.
Yet some eighty years earlier, the cost of transporting relatively cheap
Norman says, a fairly coarse semi-worsted product, from the Caen
sayetteries overland to Florence via the Rhone (then the only feasible
route), was only 8.8 percent of its much lower value, about half that of the
Wervik woollens.20
Thus, since warfare and related forms of violence were hardly
confined to land, the costs of maritime transport also rose, though not as
much as did land transport costs, during the later Middle Ages. As Irene
Katele has argued, the fourteenth century marked “a watershed in the
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21 Irene B. Katele, “Piracy and the Venetian State: The Dilemma of Maritime
Defense in the Fourteenth Century,” Speculum, LXIII (October 1988), 865-889. See also
Benjamin Kedar, Merchants in Crisis: Genoese and Venetian Men of Affairs and the
Fourteenth-Century Depression (New Haven, 1976); and note 23 below.
22 Charles-Emmanuel Dufourcq, L’Espagne catalane et le Maghrib aux XIIIe et
XIVe siècles: de la bataille de Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) à l’avènement du sultan mérinide
Abou-l-Hasan (1331) (Paris, 1966), 534-542. Shipping costs ranged from £200 Barcelonese
for small ships (thirty-forty sailors) to £400 for galleys (eighty-120 rowers and 100-150
sailors); and costs of arming such ships against corsairs ranged from £50 to £100 extra per
month. For Sicily, see Henri Bresc, “Course et piraterie en Sicile (1250-1450),” Anuario de
estudios medievales, X (1980), 751-757; and Henri Bresc, Un monde méditerranéen:
Économie et société en Sicile, 1300 - 1450 (2 vols., Rome, 1986), I, 350-352.
23 Katele, “Piracy,” 865-889; Frederic Lane, Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of
the Renaissance (Baltimore, 1934), 6-26, 36-46 and 129-134; Lane, “From Biremes to
Triremes,” Mariner’s Mirror, XLIX (1963), 48-50 (reprinted in Venice and History: The
Collected Papers of Frederic C. Lane [Baltimore, 1966], 189-192); Lane, “Merchant
Galleys, 1300-34: Private and Communal Operations,” Speculum, XXXVIII (1963), 179-205
(reprinted in Venice and History, 193-226); Lane, “The Crossbow in the Nautical Revolution
of the Middle Ages,” in David Herlihy, Robert Lopez, and Vsevolod Slessarev (eds.),
Economy, Society, and Government in Medieval Italy: Essays in Memory of Robert L.
Reynolds (Kent, OH, 1969), 161-172; Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic (Baltimore, 1973),
Cipolla, Guns, Sails, and Empire, 75-79; Dufourcq, L’Espagne catalane, 534-542; Lewis
and Runyan, European Naval and Maritime History, 121-128; Unger, Ship in the Medieval
Economy, 176-182; and Unger, “Warships and Cargo Ships,” 238-248.
history of naval plundering.”21 The typical response was to build and fit out
much bigger, more heavily armed ships, with larger complements of
specialized crossbowmen, steel-plated body armour even for the sailors,
naval artillery (from the 1330s), and more mobile small arms. Freight rates
thus rose with such substantial additions to shipping costs. Catalan evidence
indicates that arming merchant ships increased freight rates by twenty-five
percent between 1275 and 1330, while Sicilian naval records show that
freight rates virtually doubled over the fourteenth century.22 The Venetians
found their most cost effective solution in the heavily-armed, three-masted
great-galley, a speedy military and commercial hybrid vessel that became
the exclusive carrier of precious cargoes.23 Yet even these powerful ships
would not risk Atlantic shipping lanes when menaced by naval war or fleets
of corsairs. Accordingly, Venetian shipping records indicate that the
Flanders galleys made only twenty-four northbound voyages from 1332,
when state-subsidies commenced,  to 1400, as against eighty-six in the
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24 Alberto Tenenti and Corrado Vivanti, “Le film d’un grand système de
navigation: Les galères marchandes vénitiennes, XIVe - XVIe siècles,” Annales: économies,
sociétés, civilisations, XVI (January-June 1961), 83-86, and pull-out chart. No Venetian
galley fleets were sent to northwestern Europe in 1333, 1337-1346, 1348-1356, 1359-1373,
1377-1383, 1388 and 1391; up to 1390, galleys went to Bruges in only sixteen years. Their
galley fleets usually operated in the Mediterranean, but not at all in 1351-1354 or 1378-
1381, during the wars with Genoa. For the Florentines, see Fryde, “Italian Maritime Trade,”
321-326.
25 Wool shipped to Venice at £2 in shipping costs per sack purchased for £8
sterling; other charges raised total marketing costs to £6 11s sterling per sack (81.9%).
British Library, “Noumbre of Weyghtes,” in Cotton MS Vespasian, E. IX, fo. 106r-108v,
partially presented in H. Hall and F.J. Nicholas (eds.), “Select Tracts and Table Books
Relating to English Weights and Measures, 1100-1742,” Camden Miscellany, XV (Camden
Third Series, vol. XII, London, 1929), 120-20; and also partially cited in Fryde, “Anglo-
Italian Commerce,” 355. The Genoese usually employed the much cheaper round ships or
cogs, and later, the carracks; Fryde “Italian Maritime Trade,” 309-310, states that Genoese
freight rates for wool were only 5.16% of the price (8s 3d per sack); those for alum and
woad, about eight percent of their prices. See also Fryde, “English Cloth Industry;” and
Eliyahu Ashtor, “Catalan Cloth on the Late Medieval Mediterranean Markets,” Journal of
European Economic History, XVII (Fall 1988), 249-250. But other shipping costs were
much higher. According to Unger, Ship in the Medieval Economy, 169, shipping salt from
Portugal to Bruges accounted for eighty-five percent of the landed price; and shipping Baltic
grain from Danzig to Bruges was about half the landed price, c. 1400.
commercially more propitious fifteenth century.24 Even then, sea transport
was hardly cheap, for shipping a sack of English Cotswold wool to Venice
by galley added twenty-five percent to the cost.25
II
Elsewhere, I have argued that steep increases in transport costs by both land
and sea, together with rising marketing, protection, and transaction costs,
were amongst the most harmful economic consequences of late medieval
warfare. For both the Low Countries and England, their once predominant
export trade in cheaper, lighter textiles had virtually ceased by the 1320s,
when the combined production and marketing costs had risen above the
prevailing market prices in the Mediterranean basin. In this situation, the
rational response of many northern cloth producers was to transform
themselves from serving as mere “price-takers,” selling largely undifferenti-
ated textiles under conditions of “pure competition,” to become instead
quality-oriented “price-makers,” engaging in “monopolistic competition.”
Thus, in Flanders, Brabant and later in Holland as well – more so than
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26 Munro, “Industrial Transformations,” 110-148; Munro, “Resurrection of an Old
Flemish Industry,” 35-27; Munro, “Symbiosis of Towns and Textiles,” 1-74; Munro,
“Industrial Crisis of the English Textile Towns,” 103-141; and Munro, “Textiles as Articles
of Consumption in Flemish Towns, 1330-1575,” Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis, LXXXI
(1998), 275-288. On the economics of transaction costs in international trade (usually with
high fixed costs and thus considerable scale economies), see Douglass North, “Government
and the Cost of Exchange in History,” Journal of Economic History, XLIV (June 1984),
255-264; North, “Transaction Costs in History,” Journal of European Economic History,
XIV (Winter 1985), 557-576; North, “Institutions, Transaction Costs, and the Rise of
Merchant Empires,” in Tracy (ed.), Political Economy of Merchant Empires, 22-40; North,
and Robert P. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History
(Cambridge, 1973); Clyde Reed, “Transactions Costs and Differential Growth in
Seventeenth Century Western Europe,” Journal of Economic History, XXXIII (March
1973), 177-190.
elsewhere – most drapers came to concentrate more and more of their
production on the much more expensive luxury woollens, which could far
better sustain rising transport and transaction costs in long-distance trade.26
My current concern is to examine changes in the Netherlands’
textile industries in the context of the changing modes and cost structures
of international transport and trade during the late fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries. Such industrial changes followed the revival and
expansion of the transcontinental trade routes and produced an industrial
structure more akin to that prevailing in the thirteenth than in the interven-
ing late medieval centuries. The genesis of this revival in transcontinental
trade, which fully restored the overland links between Italy and the Low
Countries – though via newer, more easterly routes, away from the
battlefields of the Hundred Years War – lay principally in southern imperial
Germany (Bavaria-Austria-Bohemia).
Previously an economic backwater, this region’s economic growth
was partly spurred by a new trade in cheap flax-based textiles. Southern
Germany had long provided a small, though receptive, market for the cheap,
light, mixed linen-cotton fabrics produced by the Italian fustians industry.
However, in the 1380s, many South German towns, finding that warfare
had cut off their regular supply of Lombard fustians, began converting their
domestic flax-based linen crafts into a fustian industry, exchanging locally
mined silver for Venetian imports of Syrian cotton. By the 1420s, this new
German fustian industry had displaced its declining Lombard rival, marking
the first major revival of such cheap textiles in international trade. At the
now prominent Frankfurt Fairs, South German merchants met Cologne
merchants who, in travelling south from the resurgent Brabant Fairs, were
offering English woollen broadcloths, an important commodity that was
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27 See Van der Wee, Antwerp Market, II, 34-120; and the sources in note 6 above.
For the Venetian trade in Syrian cotton and South German metals and fustians, see Eliyahu
Ashtor, Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages (Princeton, 1983), 103-200 and 433-512;
Ashtor, A Social and Economic History of the Near East in the Middle Ages (London, 1976),
319-331; Ashtor, “The Venetian Supremacy in Levantine Trade: Monopoly or Pre-
Colonialism?” Journal of European Economic History, III, No. 1 (Spring 1974), 5-53;
Ashtor, “The Volume of Levantine Trade in the Later Middle Ages (1370-1498),” Journal
of European Economic History, IV, No. 3 (Winter 1975), 573-576; Ashtor, “Profits from
Trade with the Levant in the Fifteenth Century,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and
African Studies, XXXVII (1975), 250-275; Ashtor, “The Venetian Cotton Trade in Syria in
the Later Middle Ages,” Studi Medievali XVII (Spoleto, 1976), 675-715 (the last four articles
are reprinted in Ashtor, Studies on Levantine Trade in the Middle Ages [London, 1978]);
Hermann Kellenbenz, “The Fustian Industry of the Ulm Region in the Fifteenth and Early
Sixteenth Centuries,” in Negley B. Harte and Kenneth G. Ponting (eds.), Cloth and Clothing
in Medieval Europe: Essays in Memory of Professor E.M. Carus-Wilson (London, 1983),
259-278; Wolfgang von Stromer, Die Gründung der Baumwollindustrie in Mitteleuropa:
Wirtschaftspolitik in Spätmittelalter (Stuttgart, 1978); Van Houtte, “La genèse d’un grand
marché,” 87-112; Van Houtte, “Bruges et Anvers,” 89-108; and John Munro, “Anglo-
Flemish Competition in the International Cloth Trade, 1340-1520,” in Publication du centre
européen d’études bourguigonnes, XXXV (1995), 37-60.
28  See John Munro, “Bullion Flows and Monetary Contraction in Late-Medieval
England and the Low Countries,” in John F. Richards (ed.), Precious Metals in the Later
Medieval and Early Modern Worlds (Durham, 1983), 97-158 (reprinted in Munro, Bullion
Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the Low Countries, 1350-1500 [Aldershot,
1992]); Munro, “Mint Outputs, Money, and Prices in Late-Medieval England and the Low
Countries,” in Eddy Van Cauwenberghe and Franz Irsigler (eds.), Münzprägung,
Geldumlauf, und Wechselkurse/ Minting, Monetary Circulation, and Exchange Rates: Akten
des 8th International Economic History Congress (Trier, 1984), 31-122; Munro, “The
Central European Mining Boom, Mint Outputs, and Prices in the Low Countries and
England, 1450-1550,” in Eddy Van Cauwenberghe (ed.), Money, Coins, and Commerce:
Essays in the Monetary History of Asia and Europe from Antiquity to Modern Times
(Leuven, 1991), 119-183, especially tables 1-5; Day, “The Great Bullion Famine,” 1-54;
Spufford, Monetary Problems and Policies, 106-129, 141-146 and 180-193; Spufford,
Money and Its Use, 339-368; Van der Wee, Antwerp Market, I, 127-128, and II, 95-112; and
soon to prove instrumental in the expansion of both the Brabant Fairs and
Rhenish-South German overland trade.27
An even more important catalyst of the rapid expansion in this
German-based overland trade with the Brabant Fairs was the Central
European silver and copper mining boom. By the 1450s, a veritable “bullion
famine,” marked by plunging mint outputs in western Europe, produced a
very severe and prolonged deflation (with price falls of about thirty-five
percent), which thus meant a corresponding increase in the purchasing
power of silver.28 Such conditions, in promoting an increased demand and
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the sources cited in note 8 above.
29 John Nef, “Silver Production in Central Europe, 1450-1618,” Journal of
Political Economy, XLIX (1941), 575-591; Nef, “Mining and Metallurgy in Medieval
Civilisation,” in Postan and Rich (eds.), Cambridge Economic History of Europe, II, 691-
761; Philippe Braunstein, “Innovations in Mining and Metal Production in Europe in the
Late Middle Ages,” Journal of European Economic History, XII (1983), 573-591; Munro,
“Central European Mining Boom,”119-184; Michael North, Geldumlauf und
Wirtschaftskonjunktur im südlichen Ostseeraum an der Wende zur Neuzeit (1440-1570)
(Sigmaringen, 1990); and Spufford, Money and Its Use, 349-355 and 365.
30 See Nicholas Mayhew, “The Monetary Background to the Yorkist Recoinage
of 1464-1471,” British Numismatic Journal, XLIV (1974), 62-73; Mayhew, “From Regional
to Central Minting, 1158-1464,” and Christopher Challis, “Lord Hastings to the Great Silver
Recoinage, 1464-1699,” in Challis (ed.), A New History of the Royal Mint (Cambridge,
1992), 83-178 and 179-397; Munro, “Bullion Flows and Monetary Contraction,” 97-158,
especially tables 7-10; John Munro, Wool, Cloth and Gold: The Struggle for Bullion in
Anglo-Burgundian Trade, ca.1340-1478 (Brussels, 1973), 155-186 and 198-200; and Munro,
search for that metal,  precipitated technological changes in mining and
smelting that permitted a five or six-fold increase in the mined output of
both silver and copper in South Germany and adjacent Central Europe, from
the 1460s to the 1540s. The first stage was an innovation in mechanical
engineering: new drainage pumps and adits (downward-sloping tunnels)
that eliminated the longstanding problem of flooded mine shafts in this
mountainous region. The second was an even more important innovation in
chemical engineering: the Seigerhütten process, by which a lead catalyst
was used in smelting silver-copper ores, to separate these previously
inseparable metals. The copper so extracted from the vast ore deposits also
had considerable value, for it was the chief ingredient used in making
bronze artillery, which had already played a major role in ending the
Hundred Years’ War.29
Virtually the entire era of the Central European mining boom
coincided with the rise, expansion, and initial apogee of both the English
cloth trade and the Antwerp market (see table 2). Two coincidental
monetary changes, both of them coinage debasements, evidently inspired
by bullion scarcities, helped to ensure that Antwerp and the Brabant Fairs
would gain the lion’s share of trade in both English woollens and South
German metals. First, in 1464-1465, the English crown devalued its silver
coinage by twenty percent and gold by twenty-six percent, immediately
producing a fall in the exchange rate on the pound sterling, yet without any
inflationary consequences.30 The consequent drop in English cloth prices on
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“Central European Mining Boom,” 119-184, especially tables 2, 4, and 5. By this
debasement, the fine metal content of the silver penny was reduced exactly twenty percent
from 0.8991 g. to 0.7193 g., which thereby raised the value of a Tower Pound of silver by
twenty-five percent, from 30s 0d. to 37s 6d. sterling (or, per kilogram of fine silver, from
£4.634 to £5.793). The reciprocal relationship between a debasement and the corresponding
increase in the money-of-account value of the mint-weight of fine silver or gold is expressed
by the equation: ΔT = [1/(1 - x)] - 1, in which T (traite) is the coined value of the mint
weight (Tower Pound) in money-of-account, and x is the percentage reduction in the fine-
metal content of the penny or other link-money for this money-of-account. In August 1464
and in March 1465, Edward IV reduced the fine gold content of the noble from 6.998 g. to
5.184 g., a reduction of 25.92%, which raised the value of gold coinage (angel-noble and the
new ryal or rose noble) by thirty-five percent, from £16.667 to £22.50 per Tower Pound of
fine gold, the equivalent of a twenty-five percent debasement, by this formula. See Munro,
Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies.
31 Munro, “Bullion Flows and Monetary Contraction,” 97-158, especially tables
4-10; Munro, Wool, Cloth and Gold, 155-186 and 198-200; Munro, “Central European
Mining Boom,” 119-184, especially tables 2-5; Van der Wee, Antwerp Market, II, 80-84;
and the sources in notes 6 and 27.
32 In fairness, it should be noted that commercial and monetary disputes had led
to a temporary Burgundian ban on English cloth imports in the Low Countries, in 1464-
1465; Munro, Wool, Cloth, and Gold, 155-180; John Munro, “Industrial Protectionism in
Medieval Flanders: Urban or National?” in Harry Miskimin, David Herlihy and Avrom
Udovitch (eds.), The Medieval City (New Haven, 1977), 229-268. Total English cloth
exports rose from a quinquennial mean of 37,447 broadcloths in 1466-1470 to 62,583 cloths
in 1496-1500, while London’s share rose from 55.31% to 68.3%. These data are from
the Antwerp market made these woollens an even more attractive return
cargo for Rhenish and South German merchants exploiting the now
growing markets in Central and eastern Europe. Shortly after, in 1466, the
Burgundian government undertook a more modest coinage debasement
(silver by thirteen percent and gold by four percent), but one that produced
a very sharp alteration in the bimetallic ratio at the new Antwerp mint. By
offering much higher prices for silver bullion, it attracted more and more of
the South German silver away from competing mints, a success reflected in
burgeoning coinage outputs.31
Such monetary changes contributed to a rapid expansion of English
cloth exports. From 1461-1465 to 1496-1500, London-based exports,
principally to the Brabant Fairs, more than doubled, from a quinquennial
mean of 20,788 broadcloths to one of 42,746 cloths, to account for almost
seventy percent of total English cloth exports. That trade prompted a
Burgundian observer to compare the rising tide of English woollen imports
to an inundacionis maris immensis.32 Nothing succeeds like success.
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Eleanora M. Carus-Wilson and Olive Coleman, England’s Export Trade, 1275 -1547
(Oxford, 1963), 89-119; and Anthony R. Bridbury, Medieval English Clothmaking: An
Economic Survey (London, 1982), appendix F. For the quotation, see Dietrich Schäfer (ed.),
Hanserecesse, 1477-1530 (9 vols., Leipzig, 1881-1913), III, 105.
33 See note 11 above.
Exchanges of English broadcloths for South German silver and copper and
the related commerce lured merchants from all over Europe to the Brabant
Fairs. Finally, in 1501, the Portuguese arrived with their newly acquired
trade in Asian spices to complete the tripod that underpinned Antwerp’s
economic hegemony for the next half century.33
Table 1
Values of Imports into the Southern Netherlands, c. 1560





















































0.225 1.2% Spanish Olive
Oils
0.2 1.1%
Spanish Salt 0.175 0.9%





















Totals 10.095 54.6% Totals 8.405 45.4%
  Note: “Spanish wools” were principally merino wools imported via Bruges.
  Source: Wilfrid Brulez, “Le commerce international des Pays-Bas au XVIe siècle: essai
d’appreciation quantitative,” Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire, XLVI
(1968), 1205-1221, based upon Ludovico Guicciardini, Description de la cité
d’Anvers, 1560 (1582; reprint, Antwerp, 1920).
Table 2
Exports of Woollen Broadcloths from London and All English Ports:
















1451-60 16,291 119.83 36,595 44.52%
1461-70 18,414 135.45 33,225 55.42%
1471-80 28,886 212.47 43,489 66.42%
1481-90 35,708 262.65 52,102 68.54%
1491-00 39,320 289.22 59,764 65.79%
1501-10 49,501 364.1 81,037 61.08%
1511-20 62,761 460.68 88,345 70.94%
1521-30 67,102 493.57 87,902 76.34%
1531-40 83,617 615.05 101,682 82.23%
1541-50 112,665 828.71 126,623 88.98%
  Note: Broadcloths are quantities of cloth measuring twenty-four yds. by 1.75 yds. per
unit, including kerseys reckoned at three kerseys per notional broadcloth.
  Source: Calculated from data in E.M. Carus-Wilson and Olive Coleman, England’s Export
Trade, 1275-1547 (Oxford, 1963); and F.J. Fisher, “Commercial Trends and
Policy in Sixteenth-Century England,” Economic History Review, First Series, X
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Description de la cité d’Anvers, 1560 (1582; reprint, Antwerp, 1920). See also Herman Van
der Wee Jan and Materné, “Antwerp as a World Market in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Centuries,” in J. Van der Stock (ed.), Antwerp: Story of a Metropolis, 16th-17th Century
(Gent, 1993), 19-31.
35 See Brulez, “Exportation des Pays Bas,” 461-491; Brulez, “Commerce
international,” 1205-1221; Hugo Soly and Alfons Thijs, “Nijverheid in de Zuidelijke
Nederlanden,” Algemene geschiedenis der Nederlanden, VI (Haarlem, 1979), 27-57; Thijs,
Van ‘werkwinkel’ tot ‘fabriek’: de textielnijverheid te Antwerpen, einde 15de - begin 19de
eeuw (Brussels, 1987); Thijs, “Les textiles au marché anversois au XVIe siècle,” in Erik
Aerts and John Munro (eds.), Textiles of the Low Countries in European Economic History
(Leuven, 1990), 76-86; Herman Van der Wee, “Structural Changes and Specialization in the
Industry of the Southern Netherlands, 1100-1600,” Economic History Review, Second
Series, XXVIII (1975), 203-221; Van der Wee, “Industrial Dynamics and the Process of
Urbanization and De-Urbanization in the Low Countries from the Late Middle Ages to the
Eighteenth Century: A Synthesis,” in Herman Van der Wee (ed.), The Rise and Decline of
Urban Industries in Italy and in the Low Countries: Late Middle Ages-Early Modern Times
(Leuven, 1988), 307-381; and Van der Wee and Materné, “Antwerp as a World Market,” 19-
31; Van der Wee, Antwerp Market, II, 95-135. See also notes 36 and 38.
(1940); and Anthony Bridbury, Medieval English Clothmaking: An Economic
Survey (London, 1982), appendix F, 118-122.
During the early sixteenth century, as table 1 shows, textiles and
related products clearly dominated the imports, domestic exports, and
foreign re-exports of the Brabant Fairs. According to Guicciardini’s mid-
century survey of Antwerp’s commerce, textile products (including
dyestuffs and wool, both English and Spanish) accounted for fifty-five
percent of all imports by value. The two most important imports were
Italian silk products and English woollens, accounting for twenty-two
percent and eighteen percent respectively, with Baltic grain a close third, at
sixteen percent.34 In the export trades, despite the lack of a similarly
comprehensive, global survey, various accounts and toll registers of the
1540s indicate that textile products, led by English broadcloths and much
cheaper kerseys, were even more dominant.35 Long before this era, of
course, England’s relatively less expensive woollen broadcloths had
displaced the finer and now far more costly Flemish and Brabantine luxury
woollens, both at the Brabant Fairs and in most European markets. Within
the Netherlands, other domestic heavy-weight woollens, lower-priced
imitations from the no longer new nouvelles draperies, led by Armentières
and Neuve-Église, had also superseded these old traditional luxury
draperies to command a large foreign market and considerable sales at the
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36 See the sources in note 35.
37 Statistics from Soly and Thijs, “Nijverheid in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden,” 27-
57. See also Emile Coornaert, La draperie-sayetterie d’Hondschoote, XIVe-XVIIIe siècles
(Paris, 1930), 22-43 and 236-253; Coornaert, “Draperies rurales, draperies urbaines:
l’evolution de l’industrie flamande au moyen âge et au XVI siècle,” Revue belge de
philologie et d’histoire, XXVIII (1950), 60-96; Coornaert, Une industrie urbaine du XIVe
au XVIIe siècle: l’industrie de la laine à Bergues-Saint-Winoc (Paris, 1930); E. Maugis, “La
saietterie à Amiens, 1480-1587,” Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, V
(1907), 1-115; Maurice Van Haeck, Histoire de la sayetterie à Lille (2 vols., Lille, 1910);
Robert S. DuPlessis and Martha C. Howell, “Reconsidering the Early Modern Urban
Economy: The Cases of Leiden and Lille,” Past and Present, No. 94 (February 1982), 49-
84; Florence Edler, “Le commerce d’exportation des sayes d’Hondschoote vers Italie d’après
la correspondance d’une firme anversoise, entre 1538 et 1544,” Revue du Nord, XXII
(1936), 249-265; Donald C. Coleman, “An Innovation and Its Diffusion: The ‘New
Draperies,’” Economic History Review, Second Series, XII (1969), 417-429; Van der Wee,
Antwerp Market, II, especially 186-191; Robert DuPlessis, “The Light Woollens of Tournai
in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century,” and Thijs, “Les textiles au marché anversois,”
66-75 and 76-86; Robert S. Duplessis, “One Theory, Two Draperies, Three Provinces, and
a Multitude of Fabrics: the New Drapery of French Flanders, Hainaut, and the Tournaisis,
c.1500- c.1800,” in Harte (ed.), New Draperies, 129-172; Patrick Chorley, “The ‘Draperies
Légères’ of Lille, Arras, Tournai, Valenciennes: New Materials for New Markets?” in Marc
Boone and Walter Prevenier (eds.), Drapery Production in the Late Medieval Low
Countries: Markets and Strategies for Survival (Leuven,1993), 151-165; Munro, “Textiles
as Articles of Consumption,” 275-288; Munro, “Symbiosis of Towns and Textiles,” 62-70;
and Munro, “Resurrection of an Old Flemish Industry,” 35-127.
Brabant Fairs.36 But by the mid-sixteenth century another branch of cloth
manufacturing was on the verge of overtaking the nouvelles draperies to
become the predominant textile industry of the southern Low Countries.
Known as the draperies légères, they produced light, coarse, and much
cheaper worsted or mixed woollen-worsted fabrics. As in the thirteenth
century, the most renowned were again the sayetteries, whose products, if
not precisely identical to the medieval says, certainly represented a
resurrection of that once popular form of cloth making. Indeed,
Hondschoote, a leading sayetterie in thirteenth-century Flanders, whose
says were then so prominent in Italian markets, survived to become the
leading Flemish say exporter to Italy and the Mediterranean by the late
fifteenth and sixteenth century (see table 3). According to recent estimates
by Soly and Thijs, the various worsted or semi-worsted draperies légères,
decisively led by a multitude of sayetteries, were then producing about 3.64
million metres of cloth. The nouvelles draperies, and the few remaining
traditional luxury-woollen draperies, now led by Mechelen, produced no
more than 2.07 million metres.37
Export Trade in Textiles with the Mediterranean Basin 23
38  Edler, “Le commerce d’exportation;” Edler, “Winchcombe Kerseys in Antwerp
(1538-1544),” Economic History Review, First Series, VII (1936-1937), 57-62; Wilfrid
Brulez, “Les routes commerciales d’Angleterre en Italie au XVIe siècle,” in Studi in onore
di Amintore Fanfani (4 vols., Milan, 1962), IV, 123-184; Walter Endrei, “English Kerseys
in Eastern Europe with Special Reference to Hungary,” Textile History, V (1974), 90-99;
Brulez, “Exportation des Pays Bas,” 461-491; and Munro, “Resurrection of an Old Flemish
Industry,” 35-127. See also the sources in notes 35 and 40-41.
How did these says reach the Mediterranean? One might suppose,
in view of the evidence cited for transport costs in the textile trades during
the later fourteenth century, that the well-established maritime routes would
have still enjoyed a greater relative cost advantage in shipping the far
cheaper says to Mediterranean markets during the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. One might also suppose that only the commerce in very costly,
luxurious woollens and silks would have benefited from the revival of
transcontinental trade routes, especially in servicing fairs and markets in the
Rhineland, South Germany, Central Europe, and northern Italy. Neverthe-
less, the well documented fact that the overland transcontinental routes were
used almost exclusively for transporting Flemish says, other products of the
various draperies légères, English kerseys, and even lower-priced woollens
to Italy, is rather astonishing.38
Table 3
Production and Export of Says from the Hondschoote Sayetterie
in Quinquennial Means, 1401-1405 to 1591-1595
Year Hondschoote
Drapery Tax
Farm in £ parisis
240d per £ parisis
Cloths
represented by
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Year Hondschoote
Drapery Tax
Farm in £ parisis
240d per £ parisis
Cloths
represented by


















1526-30 1,163.20 34,896 31,583.44
1531-35 1,452.80 43,584 41,184.50
1536-40 1,439.20 43,176 42,761.40
1541-45 1,580.80 47,424 44,547.60
1546-50 1,634.80 49,044 45,453.40
1551-55 2,228.80 66,864 57,387.40
1556-60 2,472.40 74,172 67,026.20
1561-65 2,946.40 88,392 89,699.60
1566-70 2,987.20 89,616 93,057.20
1571-75 2,716.00 81,480 82,772.40
1576-80 2,224.00 66,720 81,550.50
1581-85 384.00 11,520 16,961.20
1586-90 494.00 14,820 12,127.80
1591-95 724.00 21,720 20,039.70
  Note: *A fine narrow say measured twenty-eight metres (forty ells) by 0.7 m. (one ell),
with a finished area of 19.60 metres2, and with a weight of 260.4 grams per square
metre; a small double say measured 25.725 m (36.75 ells) by 0.875 m. (1.25 ells),
with a finished area of 22.509 m2, and with a weight of 322.4 grams per square
metre. In the 1540s, at the Antwerp market, Hondschoote single says sold for
£0.783 to £0.967 groot Flemish (15s 8d. to 19s 4d. groot Flemish), which
represented, in value, 13.42 days’ wages to 18.32 days wages for an Antwerp
master mason, then earning 12.67d. (1540-1542) to fourteen d. groot per day
(from 1543).
  Source: Emile Coornaert, La draperie-sayetterie d’Hondschoote, XIVe-XVIIIe siècles
(Paris, 1930); calculated from 485-490, appendix IV (data extracted from:
Archives départementales du Nord, Section B, État général, 4068-4236, 17600);
493-495, appendix V (data extracted from Stadsarchief Hondschoote, Series GG
53, 54, 70, 38, 398, 82; CC 89, 40-50, 61-82; and HH 12-13). Note: double says
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al. (eds.), Recueil de documents relatifs à l’histoire de l’industrie drapière en Flandre. IIe
partie: Le sud-ouest de la Flandre depuis l’époque bourguignonne (3 vols., Brussels, 1951-
1966), II, 363-415.
40  Edler, “Le commerce d’exportation,” 249-265; and Wilfrid Brulez, De firma
Della Faille en de internationale handel van Vlaamse Firma’s in de 16 eeuw (Brussels,
1959). See also the sources in notes 38-39.
41 Levy of one percent tax on the value of all merchandise exported from the
Habsburg Netherlands from 10 February 1543 to 22 September 1545, in Algemeen
Rijksarchief België, Rekenkamer, nos. 23, 357-364, analyzed by J. Goris, Étude sur les
colonies marchandes méridionales à Anvers (Leuven, 1925), and by Brulez, “Exportation
des Pays Bas,” 461-491.
42  Brulez, “Exportation des Pays Bas,” 462: “Il est certain, en tout cas, que le rôle
de l’exportation par mer vers l’Italie, comparé à celui de l’exportation par terre est, en ces
années, d’importance minimine.” The only example of sea transport was a shipment of 280
wagues of lead from Veere to Genoa in October 1544.
43 See Edler, “Le commerce d’exportation,” 249-265; Edler, “Winchcombe
Kerseys,” 57-62; Brulez, “Les routes commerciales d’Angleterre en Italie,” 123-184; and
Endrei, “English Kerseys in Eastern Europe,” 90-99.
are counted as two single says; John Munro, “Textiles as Articles of Consumption
in Flemish Towns, 1330-1575,” Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis, LXXXI, Nos. 1-3
(1998), 275-288.
The evidence for such overland transport comes from three
principal sources: the voluminous records of the Hondschoote sayetterie, so
thoroughly studied by Coornaert;39 the papers of several Flemish exporting
firms, notably the Van der Molen, della Faille, and van der Heyden
companies, for the 1540s;40 and thirdly, from the same period, the registers
for a special commercial levy, a one percent ad valorem tax on all goods
exported from the Habsburg Netherlands from 1542 to 1545.41 All but one
of the accounts in these latter registers concern exports to southern and
Mediterranean Europe by land. Indeed, Brulez, who has thoroughly
examined these registers, has concluded that maritime exports to Italy in
this period were of quite “minimal importance.”42 Other commercial records
confirm that the Mediterranean basin was the destination for most of the
textile exports of northwest Europe, with virtually all of the Flemish says
and English kerseys reaching Italy by overland routes.43
Not until well into the next century, when the Thirty Years War
(1618-1648) made these overland routes so frequently impassable, was a
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44 Coornaert, Draperie-sayetterie d’Hondschoote, 247.
45  Van der Wee and Peeters, “Modèle dynamique de croissance interseculaire,”
200-228; Van der Wee, Antwerp Market, II, 323-364; Brulez, “Exportation des Pays Bas,”
461-491; Brulez, “Les routes commerciales d’Angleterre en Italie,” 123-184.
46 Van der Wee and Peeters, “Modèle dynamique,” though still partially wedded
to orthodox views on maritime transport, nevertheless believe that the cost differences had
become much narrower, without citing specific evidence. See, however, Van der Wee,
Antwerp Market, II, 225-264.
sea route utilized to transport these textiles to the Mediterranean, generally
via Amsterdam.44 Of course, military conflict still loomed large in sixteenth-
century Europe, especially the Franco-Imperial and Ottoman Wars. But
such warfare was much more organized and localized, without that chronic,
widespread, and debilitating anarchy that so plagued both fourteenth-
century and mid-seventeenth-century Europe. If local wars often blocked
one route, a safer alternative was generally available. From Antwerp and the
Brabant Fairs, there were two major southbound routes, each with its own
set of regional alternatives. The western route ran via either Luxembourg,
Trier, Lorraine, and Franche Comté, or the Rhine and Cologne and
Frankfurt, through Switzerland (Basel) and the Alps, across the Saint-
Gotthard Pass into Lombardy to terminate at Milan and Genoa. The easterly
route proceeded via the Rhineland and Frankfurt to Augsburg-Nürnberg,
and Salzburg-Innsbruck, and across the Brenner Pass into Venice.45
Unfortunately we still lack sufficient evidence to prove that in the
sixteenth century these overland routes had become cheaper than the
maritime routes. Accordingly, the converse view remains deeply routed in
the annals of European economic history.46 Nevertheless, we may, at the
outset, deduce from various developments in the sixteenth-century economy
that transaction costs had again fallen sufficiently in long-distance trade,
and especially overland trade, to permit the Netherlands to be competitive
once more in Mediterranean markets for cheaper textiles. The most obvious
factor was the restoration of relative security along the major trade routes,
more so on land than by sea. But equally important, when the transaction
sector was so subject to scale economies, was the rapid demographic, urban,
and commercial expansion in sixteenth-century Europe, especially in the
Mediterranean basin. This widened and deepened markets considerably,
stimulating the development of concentrated, large scale, and efficient
commercial flows. Moreover, international trade in sixteenth-century
Europe benefited from many significant commercial-financial innovations.
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49 Lopez, “Trade of Medieval Europe: The South,” 354. There was little incentive
to develop a sea-route before the 1270s, “when commercial opportunities in the western
Iberian states seemed too modest to warrant the effort, while the Atlantic coast of France and
The most important were: fully transferable and negotiable commercial bills
and other improvements in both public and private finance, which had
halved interest rates by the 1550s; printed and widely disseminated
“currents” for both commodity prices and exchange rates; the rise of
specialized “commission” houses (such as the Van der Molen firm);
embryonic joint-stock companies; and large-scale warehousing facilities.47
Since maritime commerce also shared in some of these improve-
ments, the crucial innovations were those unique to overland transport. First
and foremost was the rapid emergence of professional and specialized
transport or cartage firms, which promoted the deployment of the new,
larger scale, lower cost Hesse wagons (carts) in well organized convoys.
These new transport firms offered both large and small merchants, in nearby
or in distant overland markets, fully insured passage for their goods at
predetermined, fixed rates. They also provided an efficient overland postal
service. Beginning with the Antwerp-Italy routes, these new modes of
commercial transport soon spread to other overland routes servicing France,
Germany, and Central Europe. Both Brulez and Van der Wee believe that
these major developments in overland transport soon made the continental
overland routes both speedier and more reliable than the shipping routes
from northwest Europe into the Mediterranean.48 But, even without these
innovations, as Robert Lopez once observed, Italian merchants were able
to reach northeast Europe “faster by an overland shortcut,” at least when
relative security prevailed, than by the sea route.49 Indeed, for this textile
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“English Cloth Industry,” 362; Lane, Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders, 26-28; and Tenenti-
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51 Lane, Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders, 26-28; Unger, Ship in the Medieval
Economy, 176-201; Unger, “Warships and Cargo Ships in Medieval Europe,” 233-252;
Unger, “Portuguese Shipbuilding,” 229-249; Elbl, “Portuguese Caravel and European
Shipbuilding,” 543-572; and Elbl, “Caravel and the Galleon,” 91-98.
export trade from the Low Countries to Italy, the distance – from Antwerp
or Bruges to Venice in particular – was no more than 1300 km., less than
twenty percent of the sea distance between these ports. Further, both in the
thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, the shorter overland routes offered much
greater volumes of commerce to be transacted en route, with far more
frequent transactions, at lower marginal costs, than did maritime commerce
with northwest Europe.
The final proof of the economic superiority of the overland routes
in sixteenth-century Europe must lie in the fact that they commanded such
an overwhelmingly dominant share of the commercial traffic between Italy
and the Low Countries. At the same time, the expansion of the overland
continental routes coincided with the sharp decline in the Italian galley
service to Flanders and England, which had clearly become an uneconomic
form of commercial transport. The last Florentine galley arrived in 1478;
and the Venetian galleys, after making annual voyages for most of the
fifteenth century, failed to arrive in twenty-four of the forty-two years
between 1491 and 1533, when the last sailing was completed.50 Yet equally
responsible for that decline, and also for the decreasing use of more
standard cargo vessels, was the rapid development, from the mid fifteenth
century, of the so-called “Atlantic-ship” or carrack. In these heavily-armed,
full-rigged ships, the square sails of northern cogs, still ideal for their power
and speed, were combined with the lateen sails of the Arab-influenced
caravels for much improved manoeuvrability. In Italian commerce with the
Levant, according to Frederic Lane, these new carracks (almost impervious
to Muslim corsairs), and other advances in maritime navigation, were
responsible for a twenty-five percent reduction in freight rates by the early
sixteenth century. By then, the Italians were re-exporting a significant
proportion of their northern textiles, especially English kerseys and Flemish
says, to Levantine markets.51 Finally, we may best appreciate the
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complementarity between maritime and overland transport in textiles by
remembering that English textiles, both broadcloths and kerseys, could
reach the Antwerp market, to begin their long journeys, only by sea
transport.
